“Nobody with armed forces behind them can continue their political activities,” Justice Minister Abdul Rrahim Karimi told a news conference Sunday. The government has published new election laws that ban warlords from running for office. This is not the first time that President Karzai has attempted to bring about a distinction between military and political operations. But mainly because of the weakness of the central government and the delay and extremely slow development of the national army, Karzai's writ has remained limited.

When he was busy visiting the Untied States and Europe a few days ago, some leaders of the so-called mujahidin groups including Karzai's vice president and minister of defense Marshal Fahim, as well as education minister Qanooni together with leaders of the era of the war against the Soviet occupation met in Kabul. It was reported that the meeting discussed creation of a new party in favor of the jehadi groups. It was also reported but not confirmed that the meetings discussed a possible withdrawal of support from the government of Mr. Karzai. Faction and party leaders such as Mojadedi, Sayaf, and Gailani were also mentioned as participants.

In the wake of the constitutional Loya Jirga and the plan for holding of elections in June of next year, political parties and groupings are busy positioning themselves. The Northern Alliance, one of the main power houses with military strength, and especially one of its leaders, Mr. Fahim who has the largest of private armies in the country seemed to be the main contenders for power. Other parties including a few newer ones too, started to take earnest action in an effort to position themselves for the elections. Reports about these meetings indicated that while the participants had discussed strategy regarding next Afghan elections, they had not come up with naming of specific candidates. However, Professor Rabbani's name appeared in the news as a possible candidate. Marshal Fahim reportedly did not seem interested in running for office, as his grasp on power is stronger in his present position as defense minister. Some commentators suggested he might be interested to run for prime minister's position if the new constitution provides for a stronger role to be given to the prime minister as opposed to the president. However, this new development seems to have wiped out that possibility, because presently Marshal Fahim could not legally run for either of the two positions as he is leading a private army of his own.

Mr. Karzai presently seems not to have a party of his own and has not affiliated himself with any of the existing ones. It seems odd for a politician without party to stand for elections. However, many think that Mr. Karzai is gambling on his own, one-man popularity and hopes to win the elections. It may also be that he is assured of some degree of national support while enjoying full international backing especially by the United States.

Recent developments also brought to fore the important issue of the role of the so-called mujahidin groupings and those who had fought, in one way or another, in the Afghan jihad and would now like not only to be called mujahid (holy warrior) but also eligible for political and administrative positions because of their sacrifices in the way of the country's freedom.

Regarding this latter point, it is needed that either the constitution or the upcoming Loya Jirga come up with a definition of who is a mujahid and whether a mujahid be given extra-ordinary benefits in the country's social and political structure notwithstanding their professional and technical abilities. There is also a need for clarification of the issue whether the mujahids fought for the freedom of their country and defense of their religion or for acquisition of worldly power and position? Furthermore, the position of the armed groupings that go under the name of Mujahidin or a variety of factions also need to be clarified. Are they to remain as parallel military powers with the elected governments of Afghanistan in the future? And if so, for how long? If not what is going to happen to their arms and heavy weaponry and who is to collect the same and with what power? A recent United Nations report suggested that one of the main recommendations of the Bonn meeting upon which the contemporary Afghan administration is based and which called for the demilitarization of Kabul had not been accomplished mainly because the heavy arms including tanks and rocket launchers belonging to factions and specifically those belonging to the deputy defense minister still remained in Kabul. Other armies run by Ismail Khan, Dostum, Atta Mohammad and a number of other provincial warlords also are to be considered. The UN report had come short of asking the fundamental question of why should individuals be allowed to keep armies and arms if they recognize and are part of the country's administration?

Under these situations and while many political movements and parties have started getting registered in the country, democratic process seems to have been launched. However, deep down signs are that many politicians who give it only lip service for propaganda purposes do not hail democratic process in its full scale. The government seems to have become intolerant to media that is critical of its actions or inquisitive regarding its achievements or the lack thereof. The closing of a public paper that had become famous for its critique of the government is cited as an example of the administration's intolerance of free expression.

Many observers look forward to the upcoming Loya Jirga, the process for the selection of deputies to which has already been launched. The document that the Loya Jirga would study and pass, the constitution, would lay the foundation of a new Afghanistan that would rise from the ashes of a quarter of a century of imposed wars. It would allow the nation to prepare for the election of a permanent government. One of the obvious candidates, Mr. Karzai has already acknowledged that he would run. But, except for the political move of banning military personnel and the warlords from running, he has not embarked on any party based grass roots efforts to gain support for his candidacy. A situation like this shows that his optimism for success may have its roots in the support he enjoys in the international community, or assurances he has received from national elders. Otherwise running only on his own popularity as the first president of the post-Taleban era may not be sufficient reliance for success especially considering lack of progress in the fields of reconstruction, development of a national army, wiping out of Taleban who have proven a great headache for his administration and the nation as a whole, and difficulty in gaining of a smooth transition from a militaristic approach of the warlord mentality to a civil society. 10/12/03